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I Viewpoint

by CARL TOBIAS

Legislating without deliberation
Lawmakers must employ thorough procedures when
legislating changes that may seriously affect individual
rights or a co-equal branch.
Several years ago, Third Circuit
Judge Edward R. Becker trenchantly
admonished Congress to improve
the quality of its legislation, especially lawmaking that affects the federal judiciary.' Since Judge Becker
published that article, the situation
apparently has deteriorated.
Congress has recently exhibited a
striking and troubling propensity to
enact substantive laws outside the
normal legislative processes. Illustrative are recent efforts to legislate in
fields
that profoundly affect
detainees who seek federal court
relief from incarceration, and the
federal judiciary, a co-equal governmental branch. One of these
attempts proved successful and the
other did not in the initial session of
the 109th Congress.
The first example involves the 500
persons detained by the U.S. as
alleged terrorists at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. On November 10, 2005,
the Senate adopted 49-42 an amendment to the Department of Defense
Authorization Act, which would have
abrogated federal court jurisdiction
over the detainees' pending and
future habeas corpus petitions. On
November 15, senators adopted 8414 a compromise that tempered
some of the amendment's worst features, but it was not a comprehensive
solution. In late December, as Congress raced to recess, it passed the
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compromise with little change, and
on December 30 President George
W. Bush signed the measure into law.
The substance of the amendment,
the compromise, and the final version, as well as the severely truncated
processes by which Congress
approved them, were mistaken.
The amendment purportedly
removed Supreme Court jurisdiction
to decide the legality of military tribunals created by unilateral executive action four years ago. It also
eroded one 2004 Court opinion,
which ruled that due process applies
to persons labeled "enemy combatants" and prescribed standards for
challenging those designations, and
a second, which held federal courts
have jurisdiction over Guantanamo
detainees' habeas petitions. The
amendment drastically limited federal court habeas review and seriously undermined separation of
powers by assigning basic human
rights protection almost completely
to the executive.
Sharp criticism of the amendment
led to the hastily assembled compromise that the Senate adopted
November 15, but this compromise
raised more questions than it
answered. For instance, it arguably
required that the Supreme Court
appeal of military tribunals' validity
and the 200 pending habeas petitions be dismissed. Moreover, the
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compromise appeared to govern
only detainees at Guantanamo. In
late December, lawmakers passed the
compromise with few changes.
Congress adopted the amendment, the compromise, and the final
legislation after minimal consideration. The Senate Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, and Judiciary
committees have the responsibility,
and the expertise, to address the critical issues raised, but they failed to do
so. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), the
Judiciary chair, voted against the
amendment, the compromise, and
the final bill. He observed that
attempts to treat the questions were
short circuited, admonishing: "When
you undertake to remove habeas corpus, you better have a comprehensive
plan." Specter was vindicated in January when the Department of Justice
sought the pending cases' dismissal
by arguing-contrary to apparent
congressional intent-that Congress
meant the law to be retroactive.

Circuit splitting
The second illustration relates to
perennially offered legislation that
would split the Ninth Circuit. In
early 2005, Representative James
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the House
Judiciary Committee chair, sponsored a circuit-splitting proposal that
also authorized new judgeships for
appellate and district courts. On
October 27, the committee adopted
this measure, a day after the Senate
Judiciary Committee conducted a
hearing on its version of the circuitsplitting bill. In early November,
House members inserted in a deficit
1. OfLaws and sausages, 87 JUDICATURE 7 (2003).

reduction bill a circuit-division provision, thereby avoiding Senate Judiciary Committee approval of an issue
essential to the federal courts. On
November 18, the House passed that
bill with the circuit-division provision. This maneuver enabled proponents
to
circumvent normal
legislative evaluation. On December
19, Congress omitted the circuitbifurcation proviso from the final
legislation.
Both examples illustrate inadvisable use of the legislative process,
although ultimately Congress refused
to split the Ninth Circuit in this way.
Lawmakers must employ thorough
procedures when legislating changes
that may seriously affect individual

rights or a co-equal branch. Any idea
that modifies federal court jurisdiction, changes habeas corpus, affects
international relations, and implicates the "war on terrorism," or dramatically alters federal court
structure, would typically receive the
complete panoply of legislative procedures. The proposal would be
embodied in a bill introduced in
both houses, assigned to committees
with jurisdiction, receive hearings at
which experts testify, revised in
markups, voted on, and sent to the
floor where it would be fully debated
and amended, if necessary. It would
then be sent to the other house and
modified in conference committee,
should the two houses disagree. Only

then would it be passed.
The litigation that the hastily
assembled Detainee Treatment Act
provoked less than a week after President Bush signed it attests to the
problems with short circuiting thorough legislative processes. Members
of the 109th Congress's second session who still believe that Ninth Circuit division is warranted should not
short circuit those processes. ¢'¢
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Editorial
(continued from page 192)

fully adopted in a carpetbag in South
Dakota, it would receive a more
enthusiastic reception in California.
We are reminded of a federal judge's
wise observation: "Give a bad dogma
a good name and its bite may
become as bad as its bark."
We hope and expect that the voters of South Dakota will greet this
attempt to export an unnatural disaster just as they would an attempt to
export California's natural disasters.
There is no need to "restore judicial
accountability and a perception of
justice" in South Dakota. South
Dakota judges, who must stand for
election or retention election, are
already amply accountable because
of that fact, because most of their
decisions are subject to appellate
review, and because the state has a
system for investigating and imposing discipline for judicial misconduct.
Even if there were a problem of
judicial misconduct in South Dakota,
].A.LL. would not be a good solution. Apart from the fact that most of
the conduct it targets would not be
shielded by immunity under existing
law, at least one of its standards is so

vague as to invite abuse, and its provisions on attorney appointment and
reimbursement for judges would
leave them hopelessly exposed to disappointed litigants. South Dakota
voters will surely recognize that, as
scholars have pointed out, without
judicial immunity for most judicial
acts judges, including judges in elective systems, would lack the independence necessary to apply the law
without fear or favor.
An organization in which nonlawyers are both members and lead-

ers, AJS supports judicial accountability through its Center for Judicial
Ethics and Task Force on Judicial
Independence and Accountability.
We reject both thoughtless support
of, and thoughtless attacks on,
judges. J.A.1.L. is a thoughtless
attack. We do not believe that South
Dakotans are so radical that they
would tamper with the essential
structure of their government-as
they would if they adopted this
amendment crippling their judiciary-without any reason to do so. ¢!¢

And so, encouraged by the presence of a waiting jury,
parties resolved their dispute without going to trial.
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